fluenza pandemic preparedness planning efforts are becoming more relevant and timely in the public health arena. The Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) (including the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention [CDC] ), the Association of State and Territorial Health Officers (ASTHO), and the Council for State and Territorial Epidemiologists (CSTE) have encouraged state health departments to develop state pandemic influenza preparedness plans through a collaborative process of engaging key partners and stakeholders. [7] [8] [9] [10] Tabletop exercises also have been recommended as a way to augment and assess preparedness planning activities. 7, 9 This article reviews the pandemic influenza planning process in Maryland, including experience in conducting a tabletop exercise, and highlights lessons learned and recommendations for improving readiness. This is the first published report to detail the process of pandemic influenza planning at the state level.
OVERVIEW OF PLANNING PROCESS IN MARYLAND
The tabletop exercise was held in April 2004, as the culmination of a planning process that began in February 1999 when the Maryland Department of Health and Mental Hygiene (DHMH) embarked on pandemic influenza planning in the state. From the start, the planning process included five major steps:
Step 1. Various individuals and groups were identified and assembled, each with a specific role ( Figure 1) .
Step 2. The Core Work Group promoted awareness of the need for advance planning and undertook a number of activities to secure buy-in from a wide variety of organizations in the public and private sectors. This effort began with a series of meetings and presentations to executivelevel staff at DHMH and then to senior personnel in Maryland's emergency management and emergency medical agencies. At the same time, through official memoranda the Group informed Maryland's 24 local health departments, hospitals, and long-term care facilities about the importance of advance planning for pandemic influenza. The Group held two conferences to educate and engage additional potential partners and stakeholders, including those in public health, emergency management, social services, education, law enforcement, public safety, the medical community, health maintenance organizations, transportation, communication and media, local military installations, public utilities, religious organizations, and major employers and businesses. Members of the group also interviewed with local public television and print media, the latter of which produced a full feature article in a popular maazine.
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Step 3. The Core Work Group developed a draft Mary- Step 4. Comments on the Plan were solicited from local health departments and from a wide array of partners and stakeholders from private and public agencies. The comments from all of these groups resulted in revisions to the Plan.
Step 5. A senior-level tabletop exercise was conducted on April 28, 2004, to test the Maryland Pandemic Influenza Preparedness Plan; this exercise is the major focus of this report.
The exercise represented a collaborative effort between DHMH, the Maryland Partnership for Prevention, and a group of outside consultants. Its objectives were to: (1) evaluate selected operational aspects of the Plan; (2) assess whether strategies are in place for effective and rapid communication; (3) clarify roles and responsibilities (including the leadership structure); (4) identify risk communication messages and key issues in developing a coordinated public information plan; and (5) assess the decision-making process among government agencies, elected officials, and other systems involved in the pandemic influenza response.
TABLETOP EXERCISE FORMAT
The tabletop exercise conducted in April 2004 began with two brief introductory presentations to equip all participants with adequate background information. The exercise lasted 4 hours (as a matter of practicality, given participants' schedules) and was divided into a series of nine fictional scripts of a single scenario. Following the presentation of each script, participants were asked to respond to the information presented, discuss organization-specific questions posed by the facilitator, and make decisions regarding action steps that their organization would take in response to the script. Given the limited time, the exercise was designed to cover overall roles and responsibilities across agencies and to deal with operational planning issues at a high-level. As a result, the exercise was not able to assess detailed operational aspects of response or to probe deeply into agency-specific issues.
Exercise Participants, Consultants, and Observers
Forty people participated in the tabletop exercise, including senior-level professionals with decision-making authority from local and state governments as well as private organizations (Figure 2 ). Each participant was allowed to bring up to two additional experts for consultation on an as-needed basis. These consultants, as well as others who were invited to observe the exercise, had no direct role in the discussions. A total of 150 people participated in, consulted in, or observed the exercise.
Exercise Assumptions
Key assumptions of the overall scenario for the exercise included the following:
• A novel H5N1 avian influenza strain will emerge with the following key features: (1) it causes severe disease in humans, (2) the global human population does not have preexisting immunity to the strain, and (3) it is capable of moving rapidly through person-to-person spread.
• Vaccine against the novel H5N1 strain will not be available until approximately 4 months after the pandemic arrives in the United States. • Vaccine will be made available in batches as it is produced and will initially be released only in the public health sector; therefore, state officials will need to implement a priority system for vaccination of the state's population.
• Two doses of vaccine will be required to develop immunity to the novel H5N1 strain. . School outbreaks of H5N1 influenza are recognized. On November 1, CDC warns that the pandemic could be severe in the U.S., with illness rates of up to 30% of the population and a much higher than expected mortality rate, particularly among children and healthy young adults. Given the extreme virulence of this strain, CDC estimates that overall mortality rates among those who develop influenza could be as high as 1-2%. On November 4, 2004, an outbreak of H5N1 influenza is reported at Johns Hopkins University following the return of a group of students from the Johns Hopkins affiliate center in Nanjing, China. At least 16 students are ill, and several have been hospitalized; 2 deaths have occurred in previously healthy students. By November 10, H5N1 outbreaks are recognized in a number of schools in the Baltimore area, and several school-aged children have died. Many parents are refusing to send their children to school. How will decisions be made regarding closing universities, schools, and daycare centers? What additional steps will be recommended to minimize community transmission? How will these recommendations be enforced?
November 10, 2004-November 30, 2004. Health-care staffing and bed shortages become a serious problem. By late November, the state laboratory at DHMH has confirmed more than 800 isolates of H5N1 influenza in Maryland; more than 500 deaths caused by suspected or confirmed influenza have been reported. Hospitals are reporting high numbers of admissions for influenza, and staffing shortages are occurring at several hospitals because of illness in employees. A number of deaths have occurred in health-care workers who had provided care to influenza patients. These reports have received extensive media coverage and have added to concerns among hospital employees. In some locations, employees are refusing to come to work, which has further exacerbated staffing shortages. The public has become aware that several hospital pharmacies are still reserving small amounts of antiviral agents for prophylaxis and treatment of health-care providers (particularly physicians). The public is outraged that vaccine is not yet available and that health-care providers are "hoarding" antiviral agents. In early January, CDC decides that the initial batches of H5N1 vaccine will be released through the public sector only. By mid-January, Maryland has experienced more than 12,000 influenza deaths. Mortality rates in some nursing homes have exceeded 30% of the entire facility. On January 15, states are informed that CDC intends to release the first batch of H5N1 influenza vaccine on January 20. Because the population has no preexisting immunity, CDC recommends that people receive 2 doses of vaccine 1 month apart. On January 20, Maryland receives 200,000 doses, and decisions for prioritizing the initial vaccinations need to be made. Hospitals and vaccination clinics are quickly overwhelmed by people who are demanding to be vaccinated. Small riots break out in several areas, and security is a major concern. 
LESSONS FROM THE TABLETOP EXERCISE
The experience of conducting the tabletop exercise revealed several lessons and suggested ways to improve Maryland's readiness for an influenza pandemic. In addition, a number of detailed and specific issues related to the Plan were identified throughout the exercise. The exercise also provided implications for others involved in preparedness activities beyond pandemic influenza planners in Maryland. The major lessons learned are outlined below; these lessons are based on comments made by participants during the exercise as well as in the written evaluations, and they reflect the observations and conclusions of the authors of this report.
Participants realized that Maryland needs to continue to build surge capacity specific to the challenges of an influenza pandemic. The exercise demonstrated to participants that pandemic influenza could overwhelm existing public health, clinical, and community resources. While some participants were well aware of the potential surge capacity needs during a pandemic, for others the exercise served to make this issue much more apparent. During the course of the exercise, participants realized that the surge capacity challenges posed in a pandemic are much different from other local and regional outbreaks, as many responders themselves will become ill with influenza, the response will need to be sustained over months rather than days or weeks, and regional and federal resources will be unavailable or severely limited. Several participants noted that current plans underestimate the scope of impact. Of the 69 evaluation forms completed by participants or observers, issues related to surge capacity were mentioned 20 (29%) times. One respondent wrote, "Too many people are thinking of hightech business as usual responses." Another wrote, "The degree of disorder in such a disaster is underrated. . . . " Tables 1 and 2 further illustrate the serious potential health impact of pandemic influenza in Maryland, assuming a gross clinical attack rate of 15-35% (higher than typical influenza epidemics but similar to the rates for previous pandemics) and the absence of any interventions. 6, 13, 14 Table 2 illustrates the impact of an 8-week influenza pandemic with a 25% gross clinical attack rate. In this example, the demand on hospital resources peaked in week 5, with a maximum of 523 hospital admissions per day. During this week, an estimated 3,529 persons would be hospitalized, 741 would require use of an intensive care unit, and 370 would need mechanical ventilation. These numbers translate to 35% of all hospital beds, 69% of total ICU capacity, and 37% of all ventilators in Maryland, respectively. This example illustrates how the next influenza pandemic may overwhelm existing hospital resources in Maryland. Consequently, public health officials and hospital administrators must plan for surges in demand for hospital services during the next pandemic. Such surge capacity planning should include:
• Examination of actual documented numbers of available staff and volunteer resources; • Consideration of the need for consistent guidelines for managing employees who refuse to come to work; and • Specific contingency plans for situations when surge capacity is exceeded (such as credentialing, special powers to compel, and emergency scope of practice guidelines, decentralized delivery of care [e.g., home care], and alternative sites of care).
Participants noted that elected officials and decisionmakers (at the state and local levels) must have a clear understanding of the potential implications of an influenza pandemic and that additional efforts are needed to assure that such officials are adequately informed. Comments from elected officials and other community leaders during the exercise demonstrated that they had not previously appreciated the potential severity of an influenza pandemic. For example, when asked about the main lessons learned from the exercise, several participants responded with the following comments: "The extent of the next influenza pandemic; the seriousness of the problem," "Just how bad it could be!" "Scope of potential problems is larger than can be imagined and will require cooperation of all agencies in the state."
In Maryland, while public health and emergency response officials have met in various settings, it was clear from the exercise that elected officials and political leaders require further engagement to inform and equip them to respond to the next influenza pandemic. As part of this process, leaders need to know in advance the types of decisions that will be required and the implications of available policy options. For example, issues that were raised during the exercise included the following: (1) What are the conditions and procedures for closing businesses and schools and suspending public meetings? (2) What re- The numbers reflect CDC estimates and do not necessarily reflect the higher mortality rates that could be seen with a highly virulent strain such as in the 1918 influenza pandemic and in the scenarios presented in this report. Range is calculated using Maryland 2000 population from the U.S. Census Bureau: 5,296,486 (www.quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/24000.html). strictions on travel and trade can be invoked in the event of a pandemic? (3) Would influenza vaccine or antiviral agents be commandeered from the private sector as a state asset during an influenza pandemic? (4) Although the governor has broad legal authority, additional clarity is needed to define what events during the course of a pandemic would trigger that authority. For instance, at what stage will a state public health emergency be declared? (5) A strategic process for decision-making is needed that (a) clearly articulates the specific roles of all persons involved in making decisions; (b) clearly articulates the specific roles of all persons involved in providing consultation and advice to decision-makers; (c) ensures that critical and timely information is available to decision-makers regarding the consequences of each decision; and (d) is widely shared in advance with all planning and response partners.
Pandemic influenza planning needs to be further coordinated with the existing emergency response infrastructure, and additional training in incident command is needed. It was clear during the course of the exercise that although significant public health preparedness and all-hazards planning have been completed and response systems have been developed, those not directly involved in that planning and development may not be uniformly informed about and aware of the systems in place or in development. To address this issue, DHMH should continue to foster coordination between bioterrorism preparedness activities and influenza pandemic planning.
Issues around lines of authority were mentioned in 17 (25%) of 69 evaluation forms that were submitted by participants and observers. Furthermore, during the exercise it was clear that the concept of incident command was new to a number of participants. In the evaluation forms, several people asked, "Who takes the lead?" One participant noted, "We need to identify who the leader would be in a statewide pandemic-is it the Secretary of Health, the State Epidemiologist, MEMA, or the Governor?" Such questions pointed out that a need exists for increased understanding of and comfort with the interdisciplinary use of incident command systems.
More detailed operational planning is required to achieve an effective overall response. While the Maryland Pandemic Influenza Preparedness Plan is relatively comprehensive, a number of the activities outlined in the Plan still need to be operationalized further into response capabilities to assure an effective overall response. On the 69 evaluation forms, the need for additional operational planning was mentioned 25 (36%) times. One participant commented, " [Maryland] needs much work on operational aspects of the plan, especially interagency and other partner interactions." Another participant stated a similar sentiment: " [Maryland] needs to do more detailed planning and really turn our plan into a 'how to' manual." Respondents noted particular activities that need to be operationalized, including "processes for decision-making about closure of schools," "agency roles and functions such as communication flow and decisionmaking," and "staffing of alternative care sites," among others. Examples of specific operational documents that could be developed if resources allow include: (1) a resource inventory by county of sites that could be used for alternative mass care; (2) a protocol for distribution of public sector vaccine (once it becomes available), including identification of priority groups and strategies to reach them; (3) various pandemic planning guidance documents for schools and health-care facilities; (4) a surveillance protocol to monitor key parameters, such as deaths, in a timely fashion; and (5) a review of existing legal authorities in relation to a pandemic.
State planning is not complete until plans are translated into policy decisions and concrete action steps that can be implemented at the local level, where most of the actual response will take place. The current Plan identifies a number of steps that local health departments should take to assure that they are prepared for a pandemic; however, more clarity is needed concerning how many health departments actually have followed through with these recommendations. In this regard, the exercise clearly demonstrated that additional oversight and guidance from DHMH to local health departments is needed. Activities that could be undertaken include providing a checklist of planning activities to local health departments, ensuring that each local health department has a written plan for mass distribution of influenza vaccine, and performing a survey of all local health departments about pandemic planning at the local level to identify gaps.
Additional support is needed at the federal level. Many of the challenges encountered during an influenza pandemic would not be unique to Maryland; therefore, we believe that ongoing, strong federal leadership is needed to develop consistent policies across different jurisdictions. The recently released draft national Pandemic Influenza Preparedness and Response Plan provides essential guidance that can aid state and local communities in their pandemic planning efforts. 6 However, as the public health community addresses the complex challenges that a global pandemic would pose, DHHS (including CDC) should continue to work with state and local partners to refine a number of key issues raised in the current national Plan. Examples of these issues include:
• Further clarification of the level of federal purchase of influenza vaccine during a pandemic; • Further clarification regarding federal purchase or stockpiling of antiviral agents; • National guidelines on recommendations for use of antiviral agents during a pandemic; • A federal determination of priority groups for vaccination (including recommendations for prioritization within priority groups); and • Surveillance prototypes for monitoring health impact at the state and local levels during a pandemic.
CONCLUSION
This exercise was extremely valuable in bringing a diverse group of people to the table to discuss pandemic influenza. It served to engage the emergency response community and address the issues of incident command and how pandemic planning fits with the "all hazards" approach. The exercise also educated key partners and stakeholders, through an experiential approach, about the potential severe consequences of pandemic influenza, and it provided a forum to "drill down" beyond the current state plan and identify additional critical local planning activities that are needed. Instructive insights and lessons were gained from the exercise that should bolster further planning efforts in Maryland, not only for pandemic influenza, but also for bioterrorism and other public health disasters.
